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Relating  territorial  administration  and  political  authority  is  a  fundamental 
problem for public institutions and polities. 
 
The distribution of governmental authority by area and by function had already 
puzzled the founding fathers of political theory and public administration (Fesler 
1949).  The  question  still  remains  open  today:  is  it  possible  to  define  an 
acceptable level and size of territory for administering policies? 
 
Territories are also specific action and order arenas. Struggles between social 
movements  and  political  parties,  trade-offs  between  social  demands  and 
functional issues, are classic ways to explain political outcomes. Comparatively, 
the geographic dimensions of conflict and power have been and remain less 
analyzed by social sciences. Territorial politics as a knowledge domain covers 
the  way  groupings  are  constituted  as  political  and  social  entities  at  various 
spatial levels.  
 
Reflecting a federalist or pluralist perspective, the object of territorial politics is 
often  called  intergovernmental  relationships.  In  centralized  nation  states 
influenced  by  Roman  law,  it  is  rather  defined  as  the  study  of  center-local 
relationships.  
 
The territory  
 
Territory is central to the understanding of political institutions. Common sense 
defines  territory  as  a  geographical  factor.  Physical  space  may  condition 
economic activity, social interaction and political jurisdiction. While it seems to 
be a given, an independent variable provided by nature, geography nevertheless 
does  not  determine  society,  economy  and  polity.  Human  activities  are  not 
mechanistically  induced  by  climate  or  topography.    Physical  features  do  not 
constitute the whole meaning of territory as a fundamental feature in politics, 
policy making and polity (Keating 1998). Territories are also places and arenas.   
 
Social  sciences  define  territory  as  a  dependant  variable,  for  instance  as  the 
consequence of human activities, and in any case in a much broader sense than 
just its physical space or geographical component (Gottmann 1980). Space is an 
economic,  political  and  social  construction.  A  society  is  composed  of  social 
exchanges and interactions between individuals as well as between classes or 
kinship systems, that though they are spatially distant from each other, share a 
common pattern of social embeddedness, and feel close to each other in terms of 
solidarity and identity. In contemporary polities territory is associated with the 
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legitimacy,  and  representation  and  participation  are  structured.  It  frames 
jurisdictions.  
 
Political institutions seem to play a major role. They constitute territories for 
public  policy  and  for  representation.  Reference  is  usually  made  to  legal 
documents such as the constitution or to formal polities such as the nation state.  
The danger of such a narrow approach would be to study territorial politics as a 
descriptive understanding of legal texts and a narrative of the wills of policy 
makers who wrote them. It would also restrict the field to the spatial levels that 
are formalized: the local or municipal, the regional, the state or national, the 
supranational or international.     
 
Constitutions  and  states  as  specific  tools  of  government  are  quite  recent. 
Anthropologists evidence that polity, economy and society were not separate 
spheres  in  most  pre-industrial  civilizations  (Dumont  1977,  1983)  History 
underlines that physical space and national identity did not always matter as 
much as they do since two hundred years (Braudel 1993). Modern constitutions 
and  states  may  to  some  extent  rationalize  social  conventions  and  continue 
political  patterns  that  had  existed  for  centuries  (Putnam  1993).  As  a 
construction, territories are the product of evolution. 
 
A political territory is a social fact characterized by three basic properties: 
-  distinctiveness  and  unicity.  It  is  differentiated  from  other  social  and 
geographical spaces by the existence of bordures or barriers. Free and 
voluntary  entrance  is  not  allowed.  Membership  criteria  differentiate 
insiders from outsiders. 
-  domination  and  control.  Events  and  people  within  that  space  are 
submitted  to  common  principles  about  government  and  governmental 
affairs.  They  define  rights  and  duties,  allocate  hierarchical  authority, 
design  asymmetric  relationships,  and  tend  to  give  the  monopoly  of 
coercion to a center.  
-  socialization  and  culture.  A  specific  social  tissue  develops,  when  not 
languages, myths and customs.  Specific values are diffused and  common 
frameworks instilled. A shared identity allows its members to give some 
sense to their acts and non-acts as well as to their preferences. A sense of 
place remains even when boundaries fluctuate.  
 
Territories are made and remade. Those that matter the most in a certain context 
may not be the ones that are conventionally recognized. From neighborhoods to 
inter-regions, localities may exist that formally are not governmental or public 
such as civil society movements and informal functional arenas. Space and its 
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but  also  by  social  contest  and  by  changing  identities  or  solidarities  among 
parties. 
 
The center-periphery paradigm 
 
Territorial politics has been and still is influenced by a paradigm borrowed from 
modern  social  sciences:  the  center-periphery  relationships.  This  conceptual 
framework is used as a way to approach an empirical object, to generate specific 
research questions about it, to construct methods and collect evidence, and to 
infer more general statements.  
 
As  a  pair  of  concepts,  center  and  periphery  became  prominent  in  the  early 
1960s. Social sciences define the relationship between a center and a periphery 
as asymmetric and transitive. Theorists of organization argue that hierarchy of 
authority and control of the agenda are main control and legitimacy resources of 
the center in a formal organization (Thoenig 1998b). Sociologists of culture such 
as Edward Shils suggest that asymmetry or inequality within society derives 
from the fact that a center has the monopoly of defining what is sacred, with the 
ultimate and irreducible content in the realm of beliefs, values, and symbols 
(Shils 1975). The periphery is frequently taken to be in itself awkward, narrow 
minded,  unpolished  and  unimaginative.  To  avoid  impoverished  autonomy,  it 
accepts enriching dependence and defers to the center as providing the locus of 
excellence,  vitality  and  creativity.  Centrality  provides  cultural  salvation.  The 
center also controls action tools such as roles and institutions that embody these 
cultural frameworks and propagate them.  
 
Edward Shils’ theory considers centrality as a metaphor, which has little to do 
with geography. It also advocates a consensus based social life. Paradoxically 
his  paradigm  became  a  reference  for  political  economists  who  were  more 
sensitive to spatial dimensions and who argued that underdevelopment (Frank 
1967)  and  world  order  (Wallerstein  1974)  were  far  from  consensual. 
Dependency theories argue that conflict loaded domination relationships link 
core or metropolis to satellites or peripheries. The center imposes a principle of 
order, acts as a dominator and structures a unitary capacity to a periphery that is 
fragmented, disorganized and not cohesive.  
 
Considered as an analytical framework the centrality perspective stresses the 
need for a systemic understanding and interpretation.  Asymmetries, cultural 
flows, dependencies are research questions, not postulates.  It is up to inquiry to 
verify how far, in a given empirical context, the center also depends on the 
periphery, if the relationships between national, regional and local levels really 
are  transitive  or  linear,  in  which  conditions  the  role  of  the  center  is  stable, 
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The center-periphery framework assumes the existence  of a two level social 
system. The fact is that most if not all national states are territorially governed 
by systems that have three if not more tiers. The status of intermediary layers 
such  as  regions,  counties  or  states  in  federal  systems,  implies  analytical 
attention.  




Territory had been closely associated with the emergence and the triumph of the 
nation state throughout Europe. But, at the end of the 19
th century, it started to 
be considered as a legacy of traditional society. Its decline was predicted. The 
reason was that massive urbanization, a new social division of labor and the 
expansion  of  economic  markets  would  require  more  functional  approaches 
(Durkheim  1964).  Differentiated  localisms  would  be  merged  into  a  unified 
national  system.  Territorial  roots  and  identities  would  be  substituted  by 
functional and economic cleavages (Paddison 1983).  
 
Students  of  political  institution  scholars  no  longer  gave  much  attention  to  a 
phenomenon considered as belonging to the past. The reason was partly due to a 
theoretical confusion. The economy became internationally integrated. Distance 
was shortened in terms of time of transportation. Cultural standardization and 
mass markets spread around the globe.  Functional cleavages in industrial and 
urbanized societies were fought out mainly at the summit of the political system 
– nationally or internationally - and in any case independently of the vertical 
relations between territorial subunits and national governments. Modernization 
was considered as incompatible with territory.  
 
The situation changed gradually in the 1960s when it was found that territorial 
issues, far from declining or being marginal, were coming back on the political 
agenda in many countries. Sub-national levels of government were absorbing a 
greater share of governmental growth than the center (Sharpe 1988).  Political 
movements emerged around regional identities. Decentralization was claimed as 
a way to free local economic and cultural initiatives. New social classes and 
groupings questioned political representation and accountability. Sub-national 
levels  and  territorial  authorities  also  provided  more  effective  and  less  costly 
solutions to policy issues than bureaucratic welfare states. 
 
Territorial politics had to fight the skepticism of a dominant a-spatial academic 
paradigm.  Real world developments forced social sciences to revisit the topic. 
Territorial  components  of  political  institutions  and  public  administration  are 
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components as well as strong national when not supranational authorities and 
capabilities. They suggest how complex the relation is between function and 
territory,  between  world  order  and  localism.  People  carry  multiple  territorial 
identities: they feel at the same time European, French, Parisian, member of an 
arrondissement.  Problems  require  the  coordination  of  a  growing  number  of 
components,  national,  sub-national  and  supranational.  The  state,  even  in  the 
countries where it is strong and centralized, is unable to manage by itself the 
various facets of life. How polities provide in a sustainable manner hybrid and 
volatile configurations becomes a valid research and action question. 
 
The  agenda  of  territorial  politics  shows  remarkable  continuity  and  profound 
evolution  as  compared  with  the  mid  1980s  (Goldsmith  and  Newton  1988). 
While patterns of intergovernmental relations keep changing, the issues societies 
and economies face and the solutions polities adopt have evolved a lot (Balme et 
al. 1994). Some issues relate to the evolution of nation states. 
 
Public  monies  are  in  shortage.  Fiscal  crisis  in  the  early  1970s  and  slower 
economic development later led some countries to financial quasi-bankruptcies. 
The exploding costs of  the welfare state model were no longer balanced  by 
increasing  public  revenues.  Middle  class  taxpayers  revolted  against  benefits 
allocated to lower status groupings. A more global economic and financial order 
makes it difficult for a single state to have full control of its budgetary policy. 
The political status of taxation and public finance is still contested.  
 
Rationalization  reforms  sought  to  productivity  gains  and  better  coordination 
between various levels. Over the past 40 years territorial institutions and affairs 
have experienced all kinds of reforms. Some aim at making the administrative 
apparatus  more  efficient  and  more  effective.  For  instance  small  local 
jurisdictions  are  merged.  More  command  and  control  capacity  is  given  to 
politically  accountable  regional  leaders  to  put  an  end  to  the  autonomy  of 
bureaucratic silos. In extreme cases a wide redistribution of functions and policy 
domains is undertaken, either by a full nationalization of policy domains or by a 
strong decentralization of authority, revenues and accountability to lower levels.  
Other  administrative  reforms  follow  more  radical  alternatives.  Functional 
management are generalized by an agency principle. Quasi-market principles 
claimed by ‘new public management’ – style reforms relax the command and 
control approaches of intergovernmental relationships. They tend to separate the 
democratic element of government from the managerial aspects of delivering 
service.  Evidence  suggests  that  the  impact  of  such  reforms  varies  between 
national contexts. In the US reforms tend to increase the autonomy of state and 
local  government  vis-à-vis  the  federal  authorities  (Peters  2001).  In  Germany 
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Democratization and participation initiatives are said to strengthen democracy 
and lower civic apathy. (Gabriel et al. 2000). National government seems out of 
reach  for  ordinary  citizens.  Elections  are  considered  an  insufficient  voice 
strategy by inhabitants, and representation an unreliable accountability process 
to control decision makers. So how do you bring the people back at the sub-
national  level  without  weakening  national  control,  and  how  do  you  co-opt 
stakeholders  and  moral  cause  advocates  without  lowering  the  legitimacy  of 
elected bodies? 
 
Regionalisms keep reemerging in many countries (Rokkan and Urwin 1982). 
Top down regionalism refers to decentralization institutionalized from and by 
the national level. Bottom up regionalism expresses social mobilization within 
civil society around ideological references and identity claims (Keating 1998).  
In most cases they share a common characteristic. They are less violent revolts 
against an oppressive or colonialist center, aiming at setting up a totally separate 
nation  state,  and  more  claims  for  institutional  autonomy  and  functional 
devolution.  They  express  the  will  to  have  ethnic  or  linguistic  identities 
recognized such as in Spain (Moreno 1997). Their recognition may also be used 
as a top down tool allowing a national government to share the funding of policy 
domains with sub-national levels considered, or to transfer the administration of 
specific functions to a level considered as more efficient (Stoltz 2001).   
 
Public problems undergo profound changes. Issues ignore more and more the 
limits of territorial jurisdictions. They wander around and their treatment may 
induce externalization effects. The nature of solutions is also changing. This is 
specially the case when problems cannot be broken down in a set of simple 
repetitive  technical  solutions  but  require  horizontal  or  interdisciplinary 
approaches adapted to the uniqueness of specific contexts. Solutions become 
more uncertain while the problem to address more complex. The implications 
are a major challenge for intergovernmental relationships. A clear and stable 
division of functions between levels is not any longer possible. At the same time 
more  horizontal  coordination  is  needed.  Ad  hoc  functional  flexibility  and 
pragmatic inter-institutional cooperation are required. 
 
Other issues relate to beyond the nation states dynamics. The end of the 20
th 
century  and  the  new  millennium  are  associated  with  at  least  three  major 
evolutions.  
 
Supra-national  political  configurations  tend  to  cover  most  continents.  A 
spectacular change happens with the emergence of the European Union. Neither 
a full state nor a mere association of free country members, it provides a fruitful 
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National  governments  are  also  challenged  by  the  need  to  foster  economic 
development in an open economy. Territorial dimensions play more than ever a 
key  role  in  keeping  jobs  located  in  high  salary  regions  while  attracting 
investments in underdeveloped areas.  
 
International relations provide another source for the redistribution of roles and 
functions with major territorial implications. With the increasing role played by 
world  public  institutions,  nation  states  lose  the  actual  control  when  not  the 
monopoly  of  regulatory  policies  in  many  sectors.  In  some  cases  the  states 
become at the same time more territorially minded in some policy domains and 
much less in others.   
 
These evolutions raise old questions in new terms and new questions in classic 
terms: the formation of states and about their disintegration, territorial roots of 
governmental  legitimacy,  comparative  advantages  and  disadvantages  of 
decentralization  and  recentralization  reforms,  constitutional  engineering  and 
institutional  development,  ethnic  identities,  spatial  territories  and  socio-
economic development  
 
A domain of its own 
 
Territorial politics is open to differing research traditions and agendas. Streams 
and domains like local government studies (Chisholm 1989), community studies 
(Aiken and Mott 1970), policy analysis (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973), urban 
affairs (Goldsmith 1995), not  to mention electoral and party studies (Gibson 
1997) , international relations and economic sociology, are major information 
and knowledge sources for the understanding of intergovernmental relationships 
as such. It is not a coincidence that some of their most visible scholars also 
actively contribute to the advancement of territorial politics.  
 
Territorial politics has reached the status of a proper domain. It has its own 
research agenda. An active international community shares common standards 
and wills. This does not imply uniformity and consensus. Debates are permanent 
and differentiation exists.     
 
Some forms of national insularities suggest a diversity of emphasis and agendas.  
Countries such as the US, Britain and France had entered the field quite early in 
the 1960s and in the 1970s. Britain and France have maintained a persistent 
stream of publications. In the 1990s the institutional expansion of the EU has 
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The US had made massive contributions in the 1960s and 1970s. The irony is 
that American scholars carried out more in-depth field research on European 
countries than on their own. During the 1970s political scientists like Douglas 
Ashford and Sidney Tarrow made pioneering contributions on France, the UK, 
Italy and Sweden (Tarrow 1977; Ashford 1982). In more recent years they have 
experienced a decline of academic attention to the relationships between federal, 
state and local levels. Comprehensive textbooks that remain today references 
had already been published in the 1980s (Anton 1989). In more recent years the 
US have developed a far greater interest for policy studies dealing mainly with 
policy performances and who gets what when and how from governments. In 
parallel they have kept much interest for an established tradition like community 
power studies.  
 
The international community shares, however, a common standard of scientific 
excellence. Time is over when distaste for theory, predilection for ideological 
advocacy  and  social  engineering  were  acceptable.  Eclectic  methodology  and 
lack of rigor are discarded, despite the fact that some a-theoretical publications 
have been quite influential depicting in a learned manner territorial politics in 
the UK (Bulpitt 1983) or in France (Chevallier 1978). Territorial politics as a 
scientific domain is borrows massively from disciplines like political science, 
sociology and economics. The links with prescriptive approaches influenced by 
law, such as the French ‘science administrative’, or with mere descriptions of 
formal institutional settings, as in the case of pre-behavioral American public 
administration theory, have been cut to a large extent.  
 
In  the  late  1960s  a  major  project  headed  by  the  Centre  de  Sociologie  des 
Organisations in Paris studied French territorial politics using extensive field 
observation and identifying in a systematic way the informal links and practices 
that  bind  local  elected  officials  and  central  government  bureaucrats  and 
representatives (Thoenig 1975; Grémion 1976). Its apparently normative neutral 
and empirically rooted perspective and counter- were a source of inspiration for 
many scholars in Europe and abroad. 
 
 In the UK a public funded initiative was launched at the end of the 1970s on the 
specific topic of center-local government relationships. British political science 
has become a leading contributor to the advancement of agnostic knowledge in 
the domain (Rhodes 1981; Goldsmith 1986; Page and Goldsmith 1987; Jones 
1988; Sharpe 1989) 
 
France and the UK attracted many pioneering studies before the 1990s. Both 
countries  were  facing  territorial  politics  reforms  since  the  1960s.  But  their 
content and the political contexts in which they occurred were very different. In 
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Solutions discussed and adopted also covered a wide spectrum. Debates and 
initiatives kept going on. In France the issue was much less ideological, more 
functional and mainly centered around decentralization. Resistance to change 
was also very strong both at the national and at the local levels. Therefore the 
major  reform  decided  in  1981  and  1982  under  the  presidency  of  François 
Mitterrand surprised even seasoned observers and politicians (Hayward 1983; 
Schmidt 1990). 
 
Academic  debates  are  kept  alive  in  a  domain  because  different  when  not 
antagonistic  research  approaches  and  interpretations  are  in  use.  Territorial 
politics is a rather pluralistic domain theoretically and methodologically. Several 
classifications of approaches have been suggested (Rhodes 1991; Stoker 1995; 
Peters and Pierre 2000). They can be subdivided into four main classes: political 
dynamics, state theories, inter-organizational theory, negotiated governance.   
 
Political dynamics approaches: polities matter 
 
Modern political science has taken over territorial politics as one of its main 
sub-disciplines  and  marginalized  traditional  public  administration  during  the 
1960s in the US and the 1970s in Western Europe. Approaches were borrowed 
that had the discipline had developed to study other topics such as community 
power  studies  or  national  politics  and  that  were  in  line  with  the  behavioral 
revolution  launched  by  the  University  of  Chicago  based  social  scientists 
(Merriam  1921).      Inter-governmental  relationships  approaches  find  a  major 
source of inspiration in the pluralist tradition (Dahl 1961). It postulated that a 
rather  specific  world  called  a  polity  exist  with  its  own  processes  and 
rationalities.  Institutions  are  a  research  problem,  not  a  given.  Field  research 
makes  a  difference.  Real  practices,  and  not  formal  authority,  enable  an 
understanding  of  who  matters  more  and  who  has  less  influence.  Political 
dynamics are main causes of a consequence called territorial politics.  
 
Centralization provided the enigma to solve about territorial politics. All major 
countries on both sides of the Atlantic ocean were experiencing a spectacular 
concentration of resources, issues to be handled and policy domains covered in 
the hands of their national authorities, in federal as well as in unitary states. 
Many writers adopted a way of reasoning that implied a kind of zero sum game. 
The role of the center increases at the expense of the role of the periphery. The 
autonomy the localities lose is equal to the autonomy the center wins. In western 
democracies  a  general  rule  is  supposed  to  exist.  The  reason  why  central 
government are able to impose their wills in such an easy way has mainly to do 
with the fact  that local government is politically weak  (Page and Goldsmith 
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The  interpretation  of  centralization  has  fueled  intensive  debate  (King  1993; 
Stoker 1995).  A dual polity approach pushes political scientists to look not only 
at the national level but to consider also the local levels involved, their interests, 
cultures and margins of discretion. But it also postulates that the national level 
acts as a unitary and strategic actor. It assumes that the national state is able to 
get its decisions implemented. Political science tends to over-estimate the ability 
of  political  leaders,  either  local  or  national,  to  set  the  rules  of  the  game.  
Alternative approaches such as organization theory give recurrent proof of such 
fallacies. Is the center a mere set of loosely coupled political fractions?  The 
answer is: it depends, and strong evidence is needed to prove it (Dupuy and 
Thoenig 1985). The link with old institutionalism is cut when social sciences, 
having observed how scattered and fragmented the national level polity when 
not  the  executive  is,  adopts  words  that  fit  the  complexity  of  the  real  world 
(Hayward and Wright 2002). 
 
Mainstream political science favor bottom up approaches. Emphasis is given to 
local political phenomena. The national level is basically described as a set of 
background  factors  such  as  legalistic  principles  and  budgetary  transfers. 
Historical evolution over more than a century is assumed to explain how the 
periphery  is  integrated,  the  representation  models  and  the  national  resources 
allocation  structure  to  localities.  Interviews  with  local  elected  officials  and 
administrators provide a major data source. Their policy brokerage styles, their 
administrative activism and partisan commitments are compared. Inferences are 
made  from  their  experience  about  political  entrepreneurship  and  political 
conflict in central-local relationships (Tarrow 1977, Page 1991).  
 
Classic political science rehabilitates the sub-national roots of territorial politics.  
But some fundamental questions remain open.  Does a dense web of national 
state  controlled  field  agencies  –  in  a  country  like  France,  94  %  of  state 
bureaucrats operate locally - make a difference as compared with autonomous 
agencies acting as agents for a principal, the national executive, or with states in 
which the center, having very few field agencies of its own, entirely relies on 
sub-national authorities to implement its territorial policies?  Legal and financial 
data have to be questioned as relevant indicators. For instance, is the percentage 
of national grants in the revenues of local authorities a reliable indicator of their 
subordination to national polity and central policy making? Are money and law 
effective ways for the center to actually call the tune?  
 
Money talks (Wright 1988). The fiscal federalism perspective deals with multi-
level of government within the same geographical area, and policy instruments 
such as intergovernmental grants, fiscal  decentralization and  revenue sharing  
(Oates  1999).  Normative  models  are  built  with  respect  to  the  appropriate 
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harmonization and local government finance in the UK (James 2004) or about 
the equalizing performance of central grants to communes in France (Gilbert 
and Guengant 2002). Being less focused on functional models, allocating more 
attention  to  the  strategic  behaviors  as  well  as  to  the  precise  institutional 
framework in which they operate, should enable co-operation between social 
sciences and spatial microeconomics. The synthesis provided by Thomas Anton 
and his associates about the relationship between federalism and public policy in 
the US consider money and policy outcomes with the lenses of political science 
(Anton et al. 1980; Anton 1989).  
 
Political  dynamics  should  test  counter-intuitive  hypotheses.  Increasing 
centralization does not mechanically imply less autonomy and influence for the 
localities, quite the reverse. Classic political science approaches tend to assume 
that political variables explain most of the variance about territorial politics. Are 
polities really in control? To what extent should one consider political dynamics 
not as causes but as intended or unintended consequences of sub-national affairs 
and their government?  
 
State theories: global contexts matter 
 
Most  state  theories  share  a  paradox.  They  state  that  macro-level  factors 
determine patterns of central-local relations. Broader political, economic and 
social contexts give birth to an unending series of crises and changes preventing 
territorial public affairs to reach a level of stability. Center-local relationships 
are  considered  as  dependant  variables,  as  social  constructs.    Independent  or 
exogenous variables explain why and how formal as well as informal links and 
norms  emerge  and  evolve.  Center-local  relationships  are  considered  as 
dependant variables, as social constructs.  Independent or exogenous variables 
explain why and how formal as well as informal links and norms emerge and 
evolve.  
 
Early social class conflict approaches assumed that local government are mere 
passive servants of national and international capitalism (Castells and Godard 
1974; Dunleavy 1980). Critical scholars argued that territorial politics does not 
really matter as a relevant knowledge domain and action arena. In the 1980s two 
less abrupt functional explanations were offered. The dual state thesis argues 
that the state keeps control of social investment policies at the national level. It 
leaves  the  management  of  social  consumption  policies  in  the  hands  of  sub-
national  authorities.  Local  democracy  provides  remedies  to  help  the  poor 
fighting  the  failures  of  markets  while  national  politics  allocates,  in  a  closed 
corporate manner, support, goods and services to the profitable private sector 
(Saunders  1982).  Social  consumption  being  necessarily  subordinate  to  social 
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model argued that the domination of the national state stems from the fact that 
major tensions occur between the center and the localities. Societies are divided 
and unevenly developed. The local state is caught in a dilemma: it represents 
local  interests  to  the  center  but  also  is  in  charge  of  implementing  national 
policies within its jurisdictions (Duncan and Goodwin 1988). A more recent line 
of reasoning argues that the changing nature of territorial politics at the end of 
the 20
th century is less the consequence of some functional imperatives and more 
the product of social struggles in unstable international economies and societal 
orders (Stoker 1990 and 1991; Painter 1991) Post-Fordist mass production and 
consumption require new regimes to support sustained economic growth. Ruling 
political  elites  may  still  occasionally  shape  intergovernmental  relations 
according to their wills but they have lost part of their control. Established roles 
of  localities,  as  set  up  for  a  Fordist  welfare  state,  are  losing  ground.  New 
institutional  arrangements  are  still  not  stabilized.  Local  government  may  not 
necessarily remain a major player. New management thinking favors principles 
such as hyper-flexibility, customer-orientation and enterprise culture.  
 
Such a research stream, active in France and in the UK, has been influenced by 
neo-Marxism and by political economics such as regulationist theory (Aglietta 
1979). Urban renewal, housing, employment and fiscal-financial issues provide 
favorite empirical entry points. Observing local government leads many writers 
to interpret in a much broader way reforms of the national state.  Changes in the 
socio-economic  stratification  of  the  population,  formal  reform  designs  and 
ideological struggles between the left and the right have inspired many writers, 
especially in the UK (Crouch and Marquand 1989; Rhodes 2000) 
  
          
Inter-organizational analysis: systems matter 
 
A third research tradition has deep roots in sociology of organizations and the 
neo-behavioral revolution launched by Herbert Simon and James March (March 
and Simon 1958). Organizations are considered as pluralist arenas for action.  
They are structured by and around power games. To satisfy their specific stakes 
and achieve their respective tasks, actors are dependent from each other. The 
central  concern  for  this  tradition  lies  in  unraveling  the  extent  to  which 
asymmetric  exchanges  occur  and  power  is  distributed.  Their  actual  inner 
functioning is treated as a central problem for inquiry. Center-local relations are 
considered  as  an  independent  variable,  as  a  cause,  and  not  only  as  a 
consequence, of policy-making and polities 
 
Territorial politics borrows massively from this perspective because it allows us 
to explore the intergovernmental black box: dependence and power games. It 







































74/04/07    14 
a configuration of inter-organizational relations, and not as a centrifugal set of 
partitioned worlds.  Despite the fact that in most countries no formal pyramidal 
hierarchy  integrates  the  various  levels  of  government,  and  that  in  federal 
countries states or Länder have a lot of discretionary autonomy, all stakeholders 
involved in the process of territorial government are linked by some common 
action  ground.  The  national  level  acts  and  non-acts  have  direct  or  indirect 
consequences for the local level, and vice-versa, even when each level does not 
intervene in exactly the same policy domains.  
 
Michel Crozier and Jean-Claude Thoenig model the central-local relationships 
in France as a honeycomb structure (Crozier and Thoenig 1976). It links the 
smallest village to Paris.  It views relationships between sub-national elected 
politicians such as mayors and national state field agents such as prefects as 
typical and repetitive mutual dependence games. Each of them takes a decisive 
advantage from getting access and support to a partner belonging to the other 
institutional side. The reason is that each side controls information, legitimacy, 
monies,  know-how  and  policies  that  are  crucially  needed  by  the  other  side.  
Exchanges of resources are daily practices. The model is structured around a 
process of cross-regulation that stabilizes the system beyond electoral hazards 
and partisan diversity.  Its members follow informal but strongly established 
interaction norms. This model explains that the national level would be blind 
and powerless without having access to the local politicians. Local councils have 
much more influence on the state than one would expect in a jacobine country 
like France. 
 
Rod Rhodes suggests a similar model about British territorial politics (1981). It 
too  underscores  dependence  games  between  national  authorities  and  local 
administrators, participants maneuvering for selfish reasons such as achieving 
their  goals,  deploying  resources  to  increase  their  influence  while  avoiding 
becoming dependent on other players. 
 
Power is defined as the ability for an actor or a coalition of actors to get from 
other  actors  acts  and  non  acts  the  latter  would  not  deliver  without  being 
dependent from the former to succeed in their own task or turf. How some form 
of  compatibility  between  different  logics  of  action  is  achieved,  by  formal 
coordination  or  by  informal  cooperation,  how  arrangements  are  worked  out 
between various players active at various levels or the same levels, which kinds 
of  de  facto  rules  and  social  norms  regulate  these  games  between  elected 
legislators and executives, administrative agencies, interest groups, inhabitants 
and even firms, allow to understand and anticipate why a system operates the 
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Inter-organizational analysis relies on case studies. It brings the field work back 
in. Information collected by observations of daily behaviors and in-depth semi-
structured interviews plays an important role. It does not rule out that those who 
have legitimate authority at the top, whether inside specific institutions – for 
instance  the  top  elected  officer  such  as  the  mayor  in  a  city  –  or  inside  the 
intergovernmental system – for instance the national cabinet – are also those 
have real power on issues and policies. But it favors a bottom-up approach and 
the study of how decisions, whether small and routine based or highly visible 
and strategic, are made and actually implemented.  
 
Center-local relationships systems are considered as meso social orders,. Their 
properties  do  not  mechanically  and  passively  reflect  the  interests  of  some 
dominant social class, the wills of the constitutional designers or national folk 
culture.  They also are not mere applications of broader institutional patterns, as 
institutional theory would predict. Two countries may share a similar federal 
constitution  or  may  adopt  identical  new  public  management  guidelines.  The 
chances are high that actually the way they manage territorial affairs shall be 
very different. In a world of increasing globalization, local variations keep alive 
across  countries,  regions  and  even  policy  domains.  Inter-organizational 
approaches tend to treat intergovernmental systems as independent variables. 
Local orders impose appropriate issues, norms and practices to their members 
that are out of their individual control and awareness.  
 
Territorial systems address specific content issues. Several inter-organizational 
oriented scholars add two other facets to their analysis: policy networks, and 
policy analysis.  
 
Power and dependence approaches take into account the impact of territorial 
inter-organizations systems on and their variation across policy networks. Such 
networks draw together the organizations that interact within a particular field. 
Rod  Rhodes  identifies  six  types  for  Britain  in  which  local  authorities  are 
involved  and  that  reflect  a  series  of  discrete  policy  interests  (1988).  They 
differentiate according to their level of integration. Some are loosely knit. They 
are basically issue networks regrouping a large number of participants with a 
limited degree of interdependence such as inner city partnerships (Leach 1985). 
Others are closely coupled. Their access is restricted. They regroup extremely 
dependent  and  homogenous  communities  belonging  to  the  same  regional 
territory  and  communities  that  share  common  policy  and  service  delivery 
responsibility  (Ranson  et  al.  1985).  Some,  called  intergovernmental,  are 
moderately  integrated  such  as  national  bodies  representing  local  government 
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Territorial  local  orders  select  issues  to  be  part  of  governmental  agendas  at 
various levels and elaborate solutions or policies (Duran and Thoenig 1996). 
Their legitimacy derives to a large extent from the outcomes they deliver, and 
not only from law and elections. Roles, interdependence relationships and power 
structure  vary  a  lot  between  policy  sectors  even  when  the  same  parties  – 
communes, central state agencies, regional councils - are involved. At the same 
time  social  norms  are  shared  that  allow  repetitive  games  and  predictable 
behaviors to last.  His model also comes close to a conclusion made by the 
Rhodes model. In many cases the standards defined in a rigid way by the centre 
are not applicable and even applied, unless a lot of flexibility is given to those 
who  locally  are  implementing  national  policies.  In  both  countries  the  center 
faces a fragmentation constraint. Despite of the existence of the prefect, it lacks 
coordinating capacity among its many own field agencies and cannot command 
local authorities.  To discover that centralized systems such as France and Great 
Britain  experience  similar  difficulties  imposing  a  top  down  approach  to 
centrifugal territories and de facto autonomous actors, even when as in France 
the State formally controls an impressive web of field agencies, is one of the 
most valuable contributions of inter-organizational approaches. 
 
Negotiated orders: process matters 
 
Multi-level  governance  as  a  school  of  thought  has  emerged  in  the  1990s. 
Governance  remains  a  loose  concept,  ranging  from  another  way  to  name 
government to an alternative way to govern (Rhodes 1996). When dealing with 
intergovernmental  relationships,  it  focuses  on  the  discrepancy  between 
governance  and  the  constitutional  map  of  political  life  (Rhodes  2000). 
Governance is a particular form of political game. Its baseline agenda is that 
territorial relationships should be considered as sets of non-hierarchical linkages 
(Pierre and Stoker 2000; Peters and Pierre 2001; Bache and Flinders 2004). 
Negotiated order approaches lead their theorists to criticize for empirical reasons 
and on ideological grounds the center-periphery paradigm. State-centrism plays 
the role of a theoretical strawman.  
 
Knowledge evolves because at the same time new approaches offer alternative 
lenses for interpretation and societal evolutions gain the attention of empirically 
oriented social scientists. Schools of thought such as new institutionalism, game 
theory  (Scharpf  1988;  1997;  2001)  and  policy  analysis  stimulate  multi-level 
governance perspectives.  EU integration and the evolving  relations between 
sub-national, national and European levels give birth to numerous publications 
(Marks  et  al.  1996;  Puchala  1999).  Developments  propelling  multi-level 
governance  also  occur  within  states.  Cities  in  the  US  (Peters  2001),  regions 
associated with metropolitan areas in EU countries (Le Galès and Harding 1998) 
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has  less  financial  incentives  to  provide  to  steer  sub-national  government. 
Decentralization does not suffice. New inclusive models are developed in many 
countries such as Scandinavia, Germany, France, the UK, Spain or Japan. The 
studies underscore three major facets. 
 
National states no longer stand as the ‘unrivalled kings of the hill’ (Peters and 
Pierre  2001).  Transnational  forms  and  levels  of  government  are  massively 
embedded in sub-national politics. Therefore no more central level exists that 
has the monopoly of authority. To remain relevant players in the game national 
levels  have  more  than  before  it  to  earn  their  legitimacy  and  to  build  their 
influence  by  allocating  resources  and  by  acceptable  achievements.  Another 
consequence of loosening territorial authority is that institutional relationships 
do not operate through intermediaries but can take place directly between the 
local and the transnational authorities.  Bypassing regions and states becomes 
ordinary practice and appropriate behavior when no more formal vertical orders 
exist. 
 
Parties involved in territorial policy making and politics are not stable. They 
may come and leave according to issues or spatial territories but also as a result 
of their own discretionary choice. Who sits around the same table with whom 
else results from ad hoc opportunistic arrangements. Highly visible programs 
such  as  structural  funds  co-funded  by  the  EU,  national  states  and  local 
authorities have been the major source for regional socio-economic developing 
in many country members (Smith 1997). Legalistic grant allocation programs by 
which the center puts incentives on the peripheries lose importance. Local levels 
in their turn use financial incentives to fund projects that are part of regional 
interest or belong to state jurisdiction. Cross-funding patterns freely bargained 
between  multiple  parties  are  main  vehicles  for  political  bodies  like  regional 
councils or communes to finance their own projects. Quasi markets for funding 
projects  are  present  in  strong  nation-states  (Gilbert  and  Thoenig  1999). 
Horizontal  pooling  and  multi-level  cooperation  also  include  public-private 
partnership. Where and when publicness ends or starts is not any longer easy to 
define.     
 
Constitutionally  defined  authority  or  law  based  procedures  matter  less  than 
processes of exchanges and bargaining. Order and action stem from open and 
on-going  negotiations.  Elected  officials  question  the  meaningfulness  of 
principles such as sovereignty and autonomy. Beside governmental authorities 
public problem definition and solving also involve private firms, lobbies, moral 
cause groups and inhabitants. A series of policy arenas and wide civil society 
participation  imply  that  political  councils,  bureaucracies  and  parties  lose  the 
monopoly of agenda building. All major Western countries follow an identical 
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Canada  (Simeon  and  Cameron  2002).  The  national  center  in  many  cases 
allocates less money, controls less and decentralizes more. It also uses more 
constitutive policies to integrate new partners and negotiate their involvement 
(Duran and Thoenig 1996). Institutionalization of policy arenas and cooptation 
of issue communities become ordinary tools of government.    
 
Called  ‘action  publique’  in  French,  public  governance  is  defined  by  some 
authors as an empirical phenomenon (Thoenig 1998a; Stoker 1998). It refers to 
the process by which various stakeholders, public and private, deal with mutual 
dependency, exchange resources, coordinate actions, define some common stake 
to handle and build goals to reach (Rhodes 1997).  For other authors governance 
means a new theory about politics, policy-making and polities.       
 
Multi-level governance approaches often favor top-down only approaches. The 
EU  framework  fascinates  analysts  by  a  continuous  flow  of  institutional 
innovation  in  many  policy  domains  (Marks  et  al.  1996).  Various  models  of 
multi-tiered governance are identified from an action perspective. They are tools 
that are assumed to generate in a linear way differentiation and transformation 
across territorial systems (Hooghe 1996). They are by definition able to mobilize 
territorial interests (Hooghe 1999). Relying on North American and European 
research, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks claim that the days of central state 
control are over (Hooghe and Marks 2003). In their opinion, federalism theories 
have failed reconfiguring authority. They conceptualize two prescriptive models 
and  discuss  their  respective  virtues.  A  first  type  conceives  of  flexible,  task-
specific  and  intersecting  jurisdictions.  A  second  type  disperses  authority  to 
nonintersecting, general-purpose and durable jurisdictions. In their opinion there 
is exists no alternative to liberal democracy about the way collective decisions 
should  be  made.  Therefore  territorial  politics  as  a  domain  should  focus  on 
jurisdictional design and architecture. For whom collective decisions can and 
should be made matters more,  
 
Debates  are  numerous  about  the  actual  relevance  and  the  scientific  rigor  of 
multi-tiered  governance  theory.  They  hardly  rely  upon  evidence  about  how 
jurisdictional designs are implemented and do not evaluate actual outcomes they 
generate (Le Galès 1998). They  misconceive institutional path  dependencies. 
Their posture is to assume that macro and meso determinisms can be discarded 
from  an  action  as  well  as  from  an  interpretation  angle.    They  even  may 
misunderstand  the  limits  of  informal,  consensual  and  inclusive  processes  of 
decision-making. In-depth field surveys also suggest that the visible growth of 
negotiations and governance patterns has not jeopardized democratic legitimacy 
and the power of politicians. This is suggested by the French case. Over twenty 
years massive decentralization has occurred. Multi-level governance has become 
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by a lasting and powerful cross-partisan coalition of elected officials cumulating 
local and national mandates still calls the tune when institutional reforms are 
considered  and  decided  (Thoenig  2005).  Decentralization,  modernization  and 
negotiation are acceptable as long as the institutional and legalistic factors that 
protect their power bases are not jeopardized.   
 
Institutions, but also inter-organizational relationships inside the public sector, 
are not irrelevant. Therefore multi-level governance theory should escape the 
“Faustian bargain” model where making  a deal leads the parties involved to 
ignore  the  darker  effects  of  the  deal  (Peters  and  Pierre  2004).  Do  multi-
governance approaches describe spatially ordered relationships or does it refer to 
networking?  The answer is: it depends.  Therefore in order to avoid confusion 
some authors drop the label.  Chris Skelcher for instance argues that we should 
use  the  concept  of  polycentrism.  He  highlights  consociationalist  solutions 
(Skelcher 2005). They address institutional solutions for polycentric contexts at 
two  levels:  informal  norms  that  pattern  behavior  in  and  round  them,  formal 
organizational structures and arrangements.   
 
National and comparative contexts 
 
Defining  the  main  characteristics  of  territorial  politics  within  countries  and 
classifying  national  contexts  into  different  types  of  families  are  parts  of  the 
ambitions many social scientists keep in mind.  
 
Classic  political  science  approaches  have  initially  favored  local  government 
based  comparisons.  Comparing  two  states  ruled  by  Roman  law  grounded 
centralization,  Sidney  Tarrow  finds  that  in  the  1970s  partisan  politics  is  the 
fundamental mechanism of integration between the center and the localities, and 
that the peripheries are governed in a scattered and bureaucratic way (Tarrow 
1977;  Tarrow,  Katzenstein  and  Graziano  1979).    France  is  integrated  by 
administrative interactions.  Territorial representation matters more than partisan 
affiliation, and localities are well controlled by seasoned active and management 
oriented mayors. Studying the Local Government Act of 1972, Douglas Ashford 
argues that the British central government handles local government structure 
with a frontal attack suggesting ideological dogmatism and authoritarianism. By 
contrast  France,  the  ideal  type  of  a  Napoleonic  centralized  state,  favors 
consensual pragmatism and incremental reforms. The reason is that its center is 
rather weak and cautious, the local political officials having a lot of influence on 
the wills and the policies of the national state. Britain has a powerful center with 
a lot of room for functional erratic and inadequate initiatives, local politicians 
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The  interpretative  value  of  soft  descriptive  approaches  has  been  questioned. 
More  theoretically  based  patterns  should  be  applied  to  broader  samples  of 
countries. A secondary analysis of monographs on seven unitary European states 
- Norway, Sweden, Danemark, the UK, France, Italy and Spain – takes into 
consideration  patterns  of  localism  and  centralism  (Page  1991).  Legal  and 
political localism is used as a synthetic denominator. Two types are defined: a 
Northern European family, a Southern European one. They differ according to 
two  main  indicators:  legal-constitutional  subordination  –  measured  by  the 
relative percentage of total public expenditures of local and national budgets; the 
proportion of local expenditures financed by grants, and by institutional proxies 
such as which services in various policy fields localities are mandated or just 
allowed to deliver -, and political localism - the availability of direct and indirect 
accesses to the national level. A secondary analysis using identical indicators but 
adding federal countries suggests a third type, the middle European or Germanic 
class – Germany, Switzerland, Austria, as well as unitary countries being in the 
process  of  quasi-federal  devolutions  such  as  Belgium  and  Spain  (Goldsmith 
1995). Alternative classifications also distinguish three families; an Anglo type 
(Britain, North America and Australia), a Southern Europe type (France, Italy, 
Spain, Belgium, etc), and a Northern Europe (Austria, Scandinavia, Germany, 
Switzerland, plus Japan) (Hesse and Sharpe 1991). Using US federalism as a 
reference,  Deil  Wright  shows  the  existence  of  several  types  of 
intergovernmental  phases  or  models  over  seven  decades  (Wright  1988). 
Comparisons also assess decentralization policies in Latin American states and 
Spain (Montero 2001).  
 
A central control perspective adds a lot to the discussion of intergovernmental 
systems.  The  fact  is  that  during  the  1980s  and  1990s  the  ways  central 
governments formally design and informally handle their relationships with sub-
national levels have experienced major changes in many national states. With a 
few exceptions, processes of devolution, decentralization, regionalization and 
merger of local jurisdictions have induced less direct control and operational 
interference, and more indirect control by regulatory procedures.  
 
A comparative perspective of central control enables to revisit the classifications 
set up by approaches relying on the autonomy or discretion of local government 
(Goldsmith 2002). Germanic class countries have experienced the least visible 
and  dramatic  changes.  The  federal  level  has  kept  developing  forms  of  co-
operation with large urban communes and intermediary tiers that are based on 
negotiation and bargaining. But the  Laender in Germany and the cantons in 
Switzerland keep playing a very important role in controlling the autonomy of 
smaller communes. Many Southern countries like France, Spain and Belgium, 
have  significantly  reduced  central  control  on  sub-national  authorities. 
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communes that remain weak players. They control monies and policy domains 
that matter for them. But they have not been granted the possibility, as in federal 
countries,  to  legally  redesign  the  limits,  the  tasks  and  the  constitution  of 
municipal  authorities.  In  France  territorial  administration  looks  more  like  a 
market than a hierarchy. The various government levels compete with each other 
to reinforce their local influence by the power of the purse and by adding new 
policy domains to their portfolios. A wide variety of inter-institutional patterns 
of co-operation are at work across the country.  
 
In other unitary countries, no major changes are visible. In Greece and Portugal 
the center keeps a strong capacity to command and control. In the Netherlands 
the center remains financially strong and quite active in launching all kinds of 
experiments. The fact is also that it also has a long established tradition of co-
governance  with  local  governments.  The  Nordic  countries  had  made  major 
reforms  already  before  the  1980s,  as  Sweden  did,  or  have  regionalized  but 
without  going  as  far  as  France  or  Spain.  Scandinavia  has  experienced  an 
increasing fragmentation of local government. Reforms such as user-governed 
public management, particularized state grants, contracting out of services and 
neighborhood  councils  have  challenged  territorial  democracy,  increased 
governance by negotiation and inter-organizational links and not reduced the 
influence  of  professionals  (Bogason  1996).  In  the  UK  Whitehall  has 
decentralized  significant  functions  to  Wales,  Scotland  and  Northern  Ireland 
(Keating  and  Loughlin  2002).    Emerging  stronger  intermediate  ties  inside 
national arrangements may limit to some extent the autonomy of localities. At 
the same time they may provide a tool for further decentralization. While the 
center has looser control over local authorities, it nevertheless keeps its hands on 
a number of tools allowing to limit the autonomy of the peripheries.  
 
The case of Western Europe suggests that to classify national states in families 
requires some prudence. Typologies make national states look more alike than 
they really are. They give the impression that the evolution of territorial politics 
is identical across countries. Another lesson is that the growth of transnational 
arrangements  or  even  economic  globalization  does  not  imply  a  convergence 
between domestic arrangements. It is not entirely wrong to state that Western 
Europe is making a transition from local government to local governance (John 
2001). But the emergence of the EU as an actor in territorial politics does not 
make its members states more similar, as reported by a study on sub-national 
democracy  and  center-level  relations  in  the  15  member  countries  (Loughlin 
2001). To some extent their institutional fabrics dealing with territorial politics 
have  even  become  more  differentiated.  EU  announced  that  it  would  favor 
regions as partners of some of its policies. Evidence suggests that in fact regions 
remain on the whole weak tiers in terms of governmental actors and governance 
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in  a  few  cases  in  Spain  and  Italy,  they  do  not  really  matter  as  politically 
autonomous  actors.  They  rather  remain  functional  frameworks  and  highly 
dependent from the national level. Power is sub-divided among numerous levels 
and networks. A typology of regional government models is applied to 12 major 
Western  Europe  states    (Keating  1998).  Regionalization  inside  the  EU  has 
paradoxically benefited to metropolitan areas and big cities that happen in terms 
of influence and resources to be the strongest competitors of regional authorities. 
 
The idea that the national states are hollowing out does not make much sense 
when  considering  facts  (Rhodes  1996).  From  an  intergovernmental  relations 
perspective, regionalization has to be interpreted as an ambivalent process, one 
of  its  paradoxes  being  that  transferring  finances  and  policy  domains  to  sub-
national levels, far from weakening the national center, provides a solution to 
increase  its  own  power  and  role  in  territorial  politics  (Wright  1998).  
Transnational  levels  such  as  the  EU  or  NAFTA,  international  or  world 
institutions like the World Bank or the United Nations, have not seized control 
and  command  from  the  central  states.  Evidence  even  suggests  that  in  some 
countries the national legislative and executive branches, and more generally the 
politicians democratically elected by the people, have not really lost control of 
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